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The construction of identity

The deepest threats to human existence only appear to be concrete - wars, disease, famine, natural catastrophes - as we have begun to move towards a post-material age, the threat from non-material factors, quite logically, has intensified.[1] First and foremost, it is identities that are threatened by the expansion of our interests into the non-material sphere. Here we encounter new phenomena, a mounting complexity, the unknown, the different, for which we have no solutions, which we have no way of decoding. These phenomena impact on our world of meanings and devalue our existing forms of knowledge, with the result that we are beset by post-modern fears, a new set of unknowns.[2] We take refuge in what we have, our collective identities, and look to them to resolve our individual fears.

Collective and individual identities exist and impact on one another reciprocally. In this sense, there is a continuous construction of self both explicitly and through doxa, the world of implicit meanings.[3] Reflexive processes can accelerate and relativise the sense of identity, making it less secure, but they cannot eliminate it; they can add to a sense of unease, a sense that the world is not as it should be. The entire system constitutes a thought-world with a corresponding thought-style.[4]

Thought-worlds organise modes of thinking about problems and thought-styles determine the way in which these are articulated. Every form of collective activity gives rise to an identity and corresponding thought-worlds, though some of these are short lived. The literature on corporate cultures attempts to make sense of the accepted way of doing things in enterprises and bureaucracies; the argument here is that ethnic and national identities generate thought-worlds that are far-reaching, sometimes claim to be all-encompassing and offer answers to all questions. These can be termed cosmologies.[5]

All forms of collective human existence depend at some level on tacit or overt cosmologies, in as much as collective existence is about making cosmos out of chaos, a way of ordering the world and thereby making it intelligible and, therefore, safe.[6] An ordering of this kind has certain qualities of its own. It is necessarily bounded, though insiders will treat it as universal. It exists simultaneously with other cosmologies, meaning that each cosmology and corresponding identity will look for recognition from the others with which it is in contact. In a global world, this is of a wider range than ever. Equally, every identity includes and excludes and will establish mechanisms for attaining this. Finally, every such collectivity will seek to secure its own existence over time and, therefore, engages in cultural reproduction using a variety of instruments to secure its future.

Identities

Identities are anchored around a set of moral propositions that regulate values and behaviour, so that identity construction necessarily involves ideas of "right" and "wrong", desirable/undesirable, unpolluted/polluted etc. These norms are not

absolute and are not fixed definitively, though they are made to appear timeless in order to ensure their inviolability from questioning. One of the most potent forms of securing these norms is to present them as natural, by relying on natural metaphors ("blood", the body, kinship, the cycle of the seasons, growing crops etc.); these are profoundly suggestive, but are, in reality, only metaphors. Scientific metaphors still have considerable significance, though more in the area of legitimating ideas than of identity construction. Given the prestige that we continue to attribute to scientific knowledge, even if this has come in for serious questioning latterly, if something can be declared scientifically proved, it will be hard to refute. Thus the language of the sciences (natural, human, social) is regularly invoked in this way, together with representations of the scientific like tables and statistics.

In every such system of identity construction, there has to be a hierarchy of norms, as well as lateral, reciprocal relations and this requires people to be "judgmental", in as much as they must have the criteria to condemn certain kinds of behaviour or judgements and approve of others. Without such a value hierarchy, and it may be hidden in our most basic assumptions (like "common sense"), the collectivity can find itself helpless in the face of new challenges.

A system of moral regulation is, therefore, central to collective existence; the absence of it means anomie, fragmentation, desolation and, to counteract it, collectivities will go to extreme lengths with the aim of recreating it - cultural reproduction is targeted at precisely this. Overall, the system is one of shared meanings, which are continuously valorised and devalorised, according to the predetermined pattern of classification and ordering constructed by that particular collectivity. And it follows from the foregoing that such meanings are bounded, are specific to the collectivity that has generated them, though to that community, these values are understood as having universal applicability.

The articulation of identity, of collective norms, of the value hierarchy and its criteria are encoded in various discourses. These modes of expression are specific to the community that has generated them and are simultaneously a form of recognition and an instrument of cultural reproduction. In complex communities, the number of discourses will be considerable, they may well be contradictory and as a rule they will be marked by gaps, leaving space for innovation. Discursive fields, therefore, are a means of maintaining collective existence; discourses that are alien to us can be troubling or meaningless and all collectivities seek implicitly to make theirs unchallengeable because they articulate moral values.

In the world of today, there are a number of such values and corresponding discourses that have acquired an apparently universal legislative quality, notably human rights normativity and multi-culturalism.[7] The anti-terrorism warfare promoted by the United States in the wake of the 11 September has a similar explicit valorisation - it is offered as something that is inherently good, possessed of moral virtue that demands no further justification. These universal discourses claim to transcend local, particular values and those controlling them exercise a potential or actual power over other collectivities less privileged in the hierarchy.

Collective norms

It follows from the foregoing, that every collectivity seeks recognition for itself as a community of moral value creation and as a community of moral worth.[8] When this is denied or questioned, collectivities will respond with a redoubling of effort to

make their identity accepted. In this process, they may well take over values, ideas and modes of expression from other, possibly antagonistic communities and undergo a subtle metamorphosis, in which they end up resembling what they contest. Similarity of this kind does not mean, however, the end of difference. On the contrary, similarity when recognised can be deeply threatening as raising a question over the legitimacy of collective distinctiveness. Thus the proposition made by some[9] that there was no real difference between Bosnians, Serbs and Croats - that what separated them were boundaries without content - was not only based on a thoroughgoing misunderstanding, but was actively threatening as devaluing the collective norms of these communities.

As already noted, identity excludes and includes, otherwise it would not be an identity that could sustain itself. Exclusion, then is a necessary and unavoidable aspect of human existence and it is not the fact of exclusion as such that is problematical, but the particular forms of it in particular situations. In this connection, no exclusion is complete and as between collectivities that are in contact, even when the power relations between are overwhelmingly disproportionate, there will always be some exchange, some reciprocal impact affecting them.

This proposition is especially salient in the context of another universalist (and moralising) discourse, that of the victim and victimiser. Victimhood discourses have been one of the most remarkable innovations of the 1990s.[10] They are based on the foregrounding of some real or perceived injustice in the past, which is given symbolic power and resonance, and as victim, the collectivity acquires both moral superiority and inviolability. This process, in turn, has given rise to competitive victimhood discourses. Victimhood is a highly effective form of identity construction, in as much as it satisfies the need for a sense of moral worth and does so relatively easily. These discourses do suffer from a disadvantage, however, one that is largely unperceived - they focus the collectivity in question on its past, they give it moral satisfaction but deprive it of agency and they lock it for as long as the discourse is sustained into a reciprocally potentiating relationship with the victimiser, whether the victimising group seeks this or not. In this sense, victimhood discourses impose an identity on the selected "victimiser" that may not be voluntary.

Collective identity, furthermore, provides a sense of security for its members by making the world meaningful, permitting intra-collectivity communication and constructing collective forms of knowledge that allow the individual to lead a life without having constantly to make (new) sense of whatever phenomena h/s encounters. The world is made rational by becoming meaningful. But it is essential to note that this rationality is necessarily bounded, it is the rationality of the particular thought-world in which it is produced and reproduced, and while there may be cross-boundary exchange and negotiation, certain issues, certain problems will always be intractable, in which situation the best that can be attained is an agreement to disagree. A long term experience of living with disagreement can, however, make it seem less salient, so long as both parties understand it in this way. Thus there is much to be said for the proposition, prior to the 11 September, that the West was relatively satisfied that it had worked out a stable relationship with Islam, but wholly failed to understand that this satisfaction was very one-sided and, indeed, encoded a sense of subordination and thus of humiliation on the part of the Islamic world.

Collective identities protect their meanings. They do so by establishing boundary mechanisms and boundary filters,[11] which ensure that ideas external to the community are never received in full, for if they were, they could devastate the sense of collective self by introducing a tidal wave of innovation which the receiving

community had no cognitive means of ordering. It should be understood here that all collectivities and individuals use various forms of cognitive shorthand to make the world intelligible - otherwise, the outcome would be cognitive overload and anomie.[12] Boundary filters should be seen as essential mechanisms for human survival and the discourse of transgressivity, so popular in neo-Foucauldian circles, impacts with considerable damage on less protected collectivities. Boundaries exist for a purpose and breaking them down, far from promoting "emancipation", generates insecurity and, most likely, the polar opposite of emancipation, resistance, drawing in and higher boundary fences. The collective meanings that a collectivity has painstakingly constructed must be protected at all costs.

Then, cost of entry and exit must also be secured. If a collectivity is too easy to enter or leave, then the incentive to retain one's membership will be too low and over time, it will cease to have much power of attraction; eventually it will lose its purposiveness and capacity for cultural reproduction. The boundaries that keep others out have a utility that should not be discarded, however unpleasant the short term consequences of such exclusion may be. After all, if a new entrant is accepted before h/s is fully in command of all the complex codes of recognition and negotiation, then the mutual trust and loyalty that collective existence is intended to create cannot come into being. Likewise, if exit is too easy, and individuals feel that they can readily join another collectivity without losing anything worthwhile, they will do so. It follows that material explanations of collective identity, and the proposition advanced by liberals, Marxists and neo-Marxists of various hues that material benefits are the best incentive for collective action or inaction are simply erroneous.

There is a further quality to the discourses of collective identity that demands scrutiny, namely that they will seek to reinforce the sense of self by eliminating as much ambiguity as is feasible and by promoting monology.[13] Monology can be defined as a situation in which the multiple meanings of language are reduced and where those who control these meanings have the capacity to enforce this monology. From one perspective, the higher the monology, the greater the security that is created; but this has a downside - it leaves the collectivity in question unprepared for innovation and it tends to grow conservative in its ways. Quite apart from that, the security of monology denies choice. Clearly monology must by definition restrict the range of choice, as communism, against the experience of which Bakhtin was writing, so obviously did. However, the total reduction of choice can never be lasting, especially not in dynamic societies, because the costs are too high - too high for the people and too high also for the rulers, who lose their connection with the sociological reality of the society over which they rule without the feedback mechanisms that monology denies. Ideal-typically, there should be a balance between excessive and thus threatening ambiguity on the one hand and the petrification that results from too much certainty on the other.

Finally, in this section, identity creates the potential for agency. It does this by generating a sense of security, the possibility that others will understand one's initiative at broadly the same level of intention and that one's action will correspond to a set of social-moral expectations that will function reciprocally to ensure that action is feasible, meaningful and understood. This is seldom simple or straightforward, given the obstacles of tacit assumptions and the divergent readings of others that regularly result in unintended consequences or produce consequences that are partly at odds with the aims of the agent.

Social and cultural complexity will invariably deny the immediacy of action and outcome in the way that idealists and emancipators visualise and the mounting diversity of the world, the increasing difficulty of condensing cultural norms to form the base of collective action, all add up to produce a sense of frustration and lack of authenticity. There is no easy remedy. Ultimately, collective action can never satisfy all the actors involved but must result in more or less acceptable compromise. The best that collective identities can do is to offer discourses that explain the incompleteness that partial agency produces, to provide narratives that make sense of success and failure, the inequalities that mark the world or screen out the worst effects of inequality.

Implicit and explicit dimensions

It has already been suggested that the construction of self requires both explicit and implicit action and thought, and involves beliefs in both dimensions. Explicit action is clear enough. But given the infinite complexity of the world, large areas of what we know are fallible and our understanding of them is imperfect. Despite the assumption of a more or less identical process of reasoning by Enlightenment rationality, and the extension of this by neo-Utilitarianism and rational choice theory, we are all at times governed by occlusion, we do not explore very closely the bases of our knowledge, we take them for granted and rely on the forms of collective knowledge that we call "common sense".[14] In this area, the role of collectivity and collective identity cannot be underestimated and is mostly wider than we prefer to recognise, given that few people are content with seeing their rational actions as functioning within a bounded context and that they make calculations based on information that is highly imperfect. Thus identity has a vital role in helping us to make sense of the world by being able to take a great deal of it for granted. In pre-modern societies much of this knowledge was encoded in religion and had religious sanction. In modernity, we make analogous assumptions about science and expert systems, like not having to reinvent the internal combustion engine every time we sit in a car.[15]

These forms of knowledge are, at the same time, collective, that is, they enable members of the collectivity to make assumptions about one another's knowledge. In politics, for example, those living within the same political system will have certain expectations of other members about what their political knowledge is and what forms of political action are possible and impossible. Thus in Britain, it is pretty pointless to define oneself as a Christian Democrat, this just has no resonance.

Then, these collective forms of knowledge are needed to construct and reproduce the criteria by which we select answers. Such criteria are vital, without them the world becomes infinite and threatening, so that at all times people are engaged in making choices - great and small. The sharing of criteria is, thus, a necessary aspect of collective identities.

Boundaries

The boundedness of identity has already been argued. In the light of the proposition about selection, no identity or the various consequences of identity (knowledge, communication, criteria, occlusion) can be total, meaning that there are boundaries around them. Here the boundaries, boundary mechanisms and boundary control filters are central to explaining how a collectivity sustains itself. Anything can be a

boundary marker, from diet to dress codes, but probably the single most important of these divides is language. This is another fertile area for misunderstandings, because language exists at three levels - the philological, the sociological-cultural and the political - and it is fatally easy to make assumptions from one level and transfer them to another. For example, there has been considerable criticism of Croatia for introducing a new vocabulary intended to differentiate it from Serbian; in fact, this is a logical strategy in the context of seeking greater security for the Croatian identity which shares a language that is philologically the same as Serbian, but is culturally different.

Boundedness must also be maintained and protected; it does not live as if by a law of nature. Various instruments are used to achieve this. In the first place, there is sacralisation. Every collectivity places some of itself beyond questioning, by making it appear either sacred or natural and, more recently, scientific or rational.[16] In this way, scrutiny of the deepest issues of foundation is avoided, it is placed beyond questioning. This makes the sociologically contingent nature of community appear rooted in the natural order or the sacred order - the two are sometimes fused. Outsiders may well be able to see this contingency, but their comments or critiques can be dismissed as "a failure to understand" or "irrational" or ill-intentioned.

Then, every collectivity constructs and sustains boundary markers and filters. Markers have a dual function - to include and exclude. They send a message as to membership, to the limits of the acceptable within the community or to contrary. Filtering is extremely important. No message can be transferred from one culture to another without some modification. There will always be subtle and not so subtle, though usually unconscious, adaptations and omissions in this process. Boundary filters ensure that the receiving culture performs this in accordance with its specific aspirations, norms and expectations; without this, the message would be unintelligible and disturbing.[17]

This further signifies that by our reliance on culturally constructed cognitive models, we exclude certain meanings and implications that might well be salient in the culture from which the message derives. Thus the rule of law has a very particular meaning in the Anglo-Saxon world (ie. that rules must be observed strictly), but by the time it is transmitted to a post-communist polity, it is nothing like as clear-cut. Once transferred, the strict observance of rule in the United Kingdom, say, is diluted and transformed into something altogether more contingent.

Boundary markers do not exist in a vacuum. They are a part of a cultural matrix that every culture constructs and maintains. Such filters are by and large implicit and not open to the direct control of those who seek to define the norms of the culture, though they can certainly try to influence this process. This also means that the space for manipulation - and those who attempt to make salient the norms of which one disapproves are customarily described as "manipulative" - is much more restricted than a simple model of rationality might suggest. The definition and redefinition of these filters is a continuous process, one of response to external stimuli and domestic answer. The process is vulnerable to being overwhelmed by a floodtide of change, in which event the chances are that the community will withdraw into its bastions and insist on stricter definitions of self and member of the collectivity.

The myth-symbol complex may well be the single most important resource available to a community to sustain cultural reproduction.[18] The way in which memory is encoded, ideas are articulated, resonance is secured, screening out is established all depend directly and indirectly on the particular complex of myth and symbol that

any one collectivity has generated. Note here that because the myth-symbol complex is associative and resonant, rather than descriptive and rule-making, it does not have to be internally cohesive and consistent. It must, however, be recognised as "ours" and thereby be available as resource for constructing a hierarchy of norms which then permits the creation and recreation of saliency and oblivion. What is made memorable at any one time and becomes resonant can be tracked through the collectivity's use of different parts of complex.[19] To insiders, the propositions will seem wholly rational and logical, even while outsiders will be amazed at inconsistencies or gaps.

By way of illustration: in 2001, the Hungarian state passed the so-called status law, which offered ethnic Hungarians in the neighbouring states certain benefits. Among others, the Romanian government protested that this was an "ethnic" provision that contradicted Romanian citizenship. When Hungarians pointed out that Romania had near identical provisions for citizens of Moldova, the Romanians dismissed this as wholly irrelevant. It would be a mistake to see the Romanian response as cynical; rather, in the context of the Romanian myth-symbol complex, it was logical and sincere. The basic human imperative to avoid being inconsistent is very powerful[20] and the myth-symbol complex is central in helping individuals and collectivities to negotiate it in otherwise impossible situations.

Ritual extends the myth-symbol complex in one particularly important direction - it is pivotal in generating solidarity without the need to establish consensus.[21] Those participating in a ritual will undergo a strong (or less strong) bonding and will feel the affect that transcends the need for overtly negotiated agreement. Again, this is not manipulative, but a necessary implement of collective life and a model of cognitive shorthand without which the threat of overload be real.[22] Further, the repetitive element of ritual, the half-conscious knowledge, that it represents continuity is a significant underpinning of security. It should be clear that only insiders can share a ritual. To outsiders, that particular ritual will very probably appear empty and artificial.

As already suggested, all collectivities function by establishing a set of discursive fields which hold meanings steady. These are peculiar to the collectivity in question, permit the inclusion and exclusion of meanings, ensure that a debate is broadly understood in the same way by its participants, the conclusions are thereby made meaningful and thus a source of security. Central in this connection is that discursive fields demand shared meanings to work. The vocabulary employed must be understood in more or less the same way and not be loaded with discordant connotations. Such discursive fields are a vital factor in establishing and sustaining thought-styles and, as long as they are present, can notionally operate across the boundary of philologically distinct languages, though this seems to be rare. Arguably, there could well be shared discursive fields as between Francophones and Allemannophones in Switzerland or Francophones and Netherlandophones in Belgium. Gert van Istendael's ironic comment, that what keeps Belgium together is that the Walloons dislike the French more than they do the Flemings and the Flemings dislike the Dutch more than they do the Walloons hints at exactly this.[23] Self-evidently, it is much easier to establish discursive fields within what is philologically the same language, but sharing a language philologically does not automatically mean sharing discursive fields, as witness the difference between the English of England and of Ireland.

Furthermore, a shared discursive field establishes "common sense", ie the norms that members of a collectivity regard as the standard propositions that all persons of

"good sense", those who share the assumptions of the discursive field, will accept without further questioning. As a rule, members of a collectivity will tend to assume that their "common sense" is a universal norm and that those who deviate from it are overtly or covertly acting strangely. The strangeness attributed to foreigners can be located in this field. In addition, "common sense" is a powerful and effective instrument of legitimation, because no one will readily argue against something that has been declared (on what grounds?) to be the shared norm. British discourse relies heavily on this proposition. When a particular idea is described as marked by "common sense" or that it is "sensible", we can be certain that some otherwise unexamined assumption is being upgraded by the speaker or writer. It should be clear that "common sense" is culturally determined and will vary from culture to culture, but constitutes a key element of identity.

Overall, a discursive field constitutes a most powerful tool of communication and through that, of identity construction, but it should be noted that it also seeks to establish a monology by excluding certain ranges of meaning. The range of options within an identity, therefore, are restricted and at the same time are made to appear finite. Discursive fields are bounded, in common with everything else that is constructed collectively. Certain propositions, ideas, solutions are simply "unthinkable", they are screened out by the underpinning of identity and are made to appear contrary to "common sense" or "not timely" or "alien". No amount of "rational" argument will change this state of affairs, because at the end of the day, identities are not negotiable beyond certain limits.

However, while identities are fixed within certain limits, they are also adaptable enough to respond to particular situations that are regarded as challenging or threatening. Such developments, especially if they are sudden and appear inexplicable, can result in a rapid condensing of the instruments of identity construction - the institutions that have the cultural authority will use this to protect the identity group in what comes to be regarded as a dangerous state of affairs. Clearly, this was what was happening in former Yugoslavia in 1989-1991, when the threat from Serbia to recentralise power led the elites of the various republics to reconsider their loyalty towards the Yugoslav state, with Slovenia in the lead towards secession. Once this dynamic was under way, it became very difficult to reverse or negotiate it - the basic trust between the republics and Belgrade had eroded and the shared discursive fields were collapsing, those of communism most self-evidently.

On the other hand, when an identity community is engaged in normative debate and when its voice is felt to be taken seriously, the sense of security felt by that collectivity and its elites will be sufficient to let it move towards greater openness, to ease the control over the boundary filters and permit a degree of change in the definition of self. A very clear illustration was the result of the entry of the Hungarian party in Romania, the RMDSz, into the governing coalition in 1996. The initial response among the Hungarian minority was shock, a shock that the minority should suddenly, unexpectedly be "on the same side" as the Romanians. Once the shock had worn off, some of the confrontational attitude was changed into a wary expectancy.

This proposition has important implications. It means that identities are not fixed but have some capacity for movement. Second, the most effective way of achieving change is not through threats but negotiation, by a tacit recognition of the group's moral worth and giving the space for voice. Third, this further means that identity groups will not fade away, but, once constituted, will remain in being. Fourth, it is vital that all groups be given voice, without which messages will be ignored or, if

force is overwhelming, there will be surface compliance without the integration of norms (eg. the experience of communism should be clear enough).

Conclusion

The broad conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is that identities once constructed will not vanish under the impact of some universal utopia or claim to rationality. Second, the impact of universalising propositions tends to be to add to potential insecurity and, as a result, to intensify the protective measures that a collectivity will take. Third, given the mounting complexity of the world and the high prestige of the modern state in constructing order and meaning, identity construction necessarily has a national - sometimes a nationalist - dimension. This development need not be regarded as a disaster, unless one is a fully committed universalist, but as an incentive to work out the instruments that will raise security and promote recognised means of negotiating relations between different identity groups.

NOTES

[1] Hankiss, Elemér *Az emberi kaland: egy civilizáció-elmélet vázlatja* (Budapest: Helikon, 1997).

[2] Bauman, Zygmunt *Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).

[3] Bourdieu, Pierre *The Field of Cultural Production* (Cambridge: Polity, 1993).

[4] Douglas, Mary *How Institutions Think* (Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986).

[5] Berger, Peter *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (New York: Doubleday, 1967).

[6] Eliade, Mircea *The Myth of the Eternal Return: Cosmos and History* (London: Penguin, 1954).

[7] On the concept of legislation in this sense see, Bauman, Zygmunt *Legislators and Interpreters* (Cambridge: Polity, 1987).

[8] Wuthnow, Robert *Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987).

[9] Ignatieff, Michael *Blood and Belonging : Journeys into the New Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1994) is a case in point.

[10] Novick, Peter *The Holocaust and Collective Memory: the American Experience* (London: Bloomsbury, 1999).

[11] Barth, Fredrik (editor) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organisation of Culture Difference* (Bergen/Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969); Donnan, Hastings and Thomas M. Wilson, *Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State* (Oxford: Berg, 1999).

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- [15] Giddens, Anthony *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990).
- [16] Douglas, Mary *Implicit Meanings* (London: Routledge, 1975).
- [17] On reception theory, see Holub, Robert C. *Crossing Borders: Reception Theory, Poststructuralism, Deconstruction* (Madison WI: U. of Wisconsin Press, 1992).
- [18] On myth, see Hosking, Geoffrey and George Schöpflin, (editors) *Myths and Nationhood* (London: Hurst, 1997) and Coupe, Laurence *Myth* (London: Routledge, 1997).
- [19] Lotman, Yuri M. *Universe of the Mind: a Semiotic Theory of Culture*, trans. Anne Shukman, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001).
- [20] Mark Haugaard, 'Power, Ideology and Legitimacy', in Goverde, Henri et al. (editors), *Power in Contemporary Politics: Theories, Practices, Globalisations* (London: SAGE, 2000), pp.59-76. See also Simon, Herbert A., *Reason in Human Affairs* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983).
- [21] Kertzer, David I. *Ritual, Politics and Power* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1988).
- [22] Augoustinos, Martha and Iain Walker, *Social Cognitions: an Integrated Introduction* (London: SAGE, 1995).
- [23] van Istendael, Geert *A belga labirintus avagy a formátlanság bája* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1994) a translation of *Het Belgisch labyrint of De schoonheid der wanstaltigheid* [The Belgian Labyrinth or the Charms of Formlessness].